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“Agents of Description”
Animals, Affect, and Care in Thalia Field’s 






In this article, I explore questions of laboratory animal agency in dialogue with Thalia 
Field’s literary text “Experimental Animals: A Reality Fiction” (2016). Using the frame-
work of “care” (understood, following María Puig de la Bellacasa 2017, as a multi-dimen-
sional concept comprising affect, ethics, and practice), I consider how Field’s synaesthetic 
descriptions of animal suffering create an affective response in readers, alerting them to a 
shared carnal vulnerability. Indeed, rather than anthropomorphizing animals through nar-
ration or focalization, Field “stays with the body” to consider how animals call to us not as 
experimental objects, but as ethical subjects, how they become – in other words – agents of 
the description (Stewart 2016). To develop this idea, I introduce the “practiced” dimension 
of care. More specifically, I explore how Field uses narrative strategies like first-person 
narration and second-person address, “bridge characters” (James 2019), and juxtaposition 
to morally structure the text and encourage “transspecies alliances” between readers and 
represented animals. I argue that such devices direct and train affect, allowing us to better 
appreciate how conceptions of nonhuman animal agency are always contextualized within 
particular sets of social, cultural, historical, and disciplinary frames and practices.
Keywords: agency; care; critical animal studies; description; ethics; lab lit; 
laboratory animals; narratology; practice; Thalia Field.
1. introduction
In February 2019, researchers from Zhejiang University published an 
article titled: “Human Mind Control of Rat Cyborg’s Continuous Loco-
motion with Wireless Brain-to-Brain Interface” (Zhang et al. 2019). By 
implanting microelectrodes into the brain of a living rat and mediating 
the motor imagery “instructions” of the human operator through a com-
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puter which decoded electroencephalogram (EEG), humans took “brain 
control” of the rat, moving it through a maze (Zhang et al. 2019, 3). In the 
process of directing the rat, researchers argued that “a tacit understand-
ing [formed] between the human and the rat cyborg” (ibid., 7, n. 2). Yet, 
contra the researchers’ claim, the relationship outlined here is completely 
antithetical to the formation of such an understanding. Instead, what we 
have is a relationship which is unidirectional and wholly nonreciprocal in 
terms of flows of information. The animal becomes a shell through which 
the ghost of human consciousness passes. This highly sensational and 
ethically problematic  1 example exaggerates a tendency within scientific 
experimentation to strip animals of their agency to respond. As Ronald 
Bogue puts it, “the ideal of pure objectivity in […] experimentation mis-
construes the relationship between researchers and their animal subjects 
in which both parties affect and are affected by, one another, even in the 
laboratory” (2015, 170; Despret 2004). While the animal here is linguisti-
cally present, it has become what ethnographer Michael Lynch calls an 
“analytic” animal – that is, “data” to be interpreted, “a creature in gener-
alized mathematical space”, which is “a product of human intervention” 
and invention (1988, 267, 269).
The kind of bodily puppetry we find in Zhejiang’s rat cyborg experi-
ment has a long history. Indeed, the perceived malleability of animal 
bodies was central to the vivisectionist practices that helped shape the 
field we today recognize today as biomedicine. Writing in the nineteenth-
century, Claude Bernard (1813-1878), arguably France’s most famous 
physiologist, would state that “[t]he scientific principle of vivisection is 
easy to grasp. It is always a question of separating or altering parts of the 
living machine, so as to study them and thus to decide how they function 
and for what” (Field 2016, Kindle Location 174)  2. In an experiment that 
shares uncomfortable resonance with Zhang et al.’s rat cyborg research, 
Bernard and his colleagues intervened in animal locomotion by “altering 
parts” of the animals’ bodies: by “damag[ing] the brain of a pigeon or 
 1 To justify research on ethical grounds, researchers need to demonstrate that “the 
ethical cost of the research (the pain of the animals, the ultimate death of the animals) 
[is] either balanced or outweighed by the potential value of the research to human or 
animal health, the advancement of knowledge, or the good of society” (UConn Health, 
“Scientific and Ethical Justification”, https://ovpr.uchc.edu/services/rics/animal/iacuc/
ethics/scientific-ethical-justification/). While research exploring methods of brain con-
trol might be able to be scientifically justified (in that it is “generalizable to other spe-
cies”), it hardly seems to meet any of the categories required for ethical justification. See 
also APA guidelines: https://www.apa.org/science/leadership/care/guidelines.
 2 References to Field’s text will henceforth appear as Field, KL xx, or simply KL xx.
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cat” the vivisectionists made the animal turn “around and around” so 
that it was “no longer able to walk straight” (Field, KL 174).
In this paper, I consider laboratory animal agency in dialogue with 
Thalia Field’s Experimental Animals: A Reality Fiction (2016), a liter-
ary text set during this foundational period in biomedical history. Con-
structed as a quasi-witness testimony, Field’s “reality fiction” unfolds 
as a collective statement made in a trans-historical trial that transports 
present-day readers hundreds of years into the past. As the title suggests, 
this work takes as its focus animal experimentation, critically engag-
ing with the origins of contemporary biomedicine. The fiction is made 
up of a collage of historical fragments from nineteenth-century France 
– though, also occasionally supplemented by historical snippets from 
England, Europe, and “the American Republic”. Collecting and collat-
ing literary, philosophical, and scientific quotations, diary entries, let-
ters, newspaper clippings, photos, diagrams, and political and historical 
information, Field weaves together an alternative narrative of “accidental 
activist” Marie-Françoise (“Fanny”) Bernard. Fanny, Claude Bernard’s 
wife, has been historically characterized as greedy, stupid, and hostile – 
an “executioner-woman” who fought “the freedoms of modern science” 
(de Monzie in Field, KL 56). Her husband, Claude, is hailed by many 
as the father of modern medicine and is renowned for replacing theory, 
philosophy, and speculation in science with “verifiable” practices like 
experiments on living animals. In addition, his work on “blind experi-
mentation” – which, in the case of animal experiments involves withhold-
ing from observers the hypothesis being tested in order to avoid bias – is 
widely agreed to be important in the development of “scientific objectiv-
ity”. Yet, in Field’s “fiction”, it is Fanny Bernard who takes center stage, 
and she emerges as a sympathetic spectre-protagonist who is intuitive, 
intelligent, determined, and angry. Throughout, Fanny and Claude’s 
unhappy marriage microcosmically enacts a broader struggle between 
the ethical agenda of animal activists and the experimentalists’ pursuit of 
scientific knowledge.
Given its hybrid status as an assemblage of historical fact woven 
together through the fictionalized characterization of (the historical 
figure) Fanny, Field’s text is uniquely situated at the intersection of sci-
ence and literature and, as such, offers an opportunity to explore notions 
of nonhuman animal agency through both of these lenses. Indeed, 
through its nuanced and cross-disciplinary exploration of vivisection, 
Field’s fiction navigates a myriad of ethical complexities pertinent to – 
but currently unaddressed – in contemporary biomedical experiments 
like Zhejiang’s rat cyborg research. Where scientific writing has, as we 
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will see, a tendency to downplay both the participation and presence of 
animals, Field’s fiction uses attentive, visceral descriptions of animals to 
suggest that rather than “analytic”, animals are “affective” beings – with 
“affective” here understood as an “actant […] which has efficacy, can 
do things, has sufficient coherence to make a difference, produce effects, 
alter the course of events” (Bennett 2010, viii)  3.
In what follows, I explore some of the narrative strategies Field uses 
to portray animals as lively and agential without rendering them anthro-
pomorphized extensions of the human  4. By coupling affectively engaging 
descriptions, and positioning techniques like an attentive “bridge charac-
ter” (a concept I will expand on), Field situates her readers in a web of 
care where they are encouraged to turn a critical eye to science’s frequent 
obfuscation of the agency of nonhuman animals. As I will argue, read-
ers engage with animals in Field’s text not through a single strategy of 
“narrative engagement”; for example, Amy Coplan’s (2004) categories of 
“emotional contagion”, “empathy”, or “sympathy”, but instead through 
a form of careful engagement which traverses empathy’s feeling for with 
sympathy’s feeling with.
According to María Puig de la Bellacasa, care is a multi-dimensional 
and multi-species concept comprising affect, ethics, and practice  5. In 
his elegant summary of Puig de la Bellacasa’s work for the journal Envi-
ronmental Humanities’ “Living Lexicon”, Thom van Dooren describes 
care as “an entry point into a grounded form of embodied and practical 
ethics” (2014, 292):
As an affective state, caring is an embodied phenomenon, the product of 
intellectual and emotional competencies […]. As an ethical obligation, to 
care is to become subject to another, to recognize an obligation to look 
after another. Finally, as a practical labour, caring requires more from us 
than abstract well wishing, it requires that we get involved in some con-
crete way, that we do. (ibid.)
Taking my cue from Bellacasa’s tripartite approach to care, in the 
sections which follow I explore care’s affective, practical, and ethical 
 3 For more on the absence of animals in scientific reports, see Birke and Smith 
1995 and Migeon 2014.
 4 See also Lambert 2021, forthcoming.
 5 As she writes in Matters of Care, Puig de la Bellacasa’s conception of the trip-
tych of care is inspired by Joan Tronto and work where care is described as including, 
“everything we do to maintain, continue and repair ‘our world’ so that we can live in it 
as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, 
all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web” (Tronto 1993, 103; 
emphasis added by Puig de la Bellacasa).
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dimensions, considering how Field’s represented animals call to us 
not as experimental objects but as ethical subjects. After situating my 
approach within the field of literary animal studies, I introduce some of 
the tensions between detached, observational description (often favored 
by nineteenth-century scientists and authors like Émile Zola) and the 
viscerally-affecting descriptions Fanny offers us, paying particular atten-
tion to the affective exchanges that occur when description is reframed 
as a haptic, rather than visual, practice. Prompted by van Dooren’s con-
tention that “While we may all ultimately be connected to one another, 
the specificity and proximity of connections matters” (2016, 60), the 
final section of the essay considers the practical dimension of care by 
beginning to attend to some of the narrative strategies used to create 
human-nonhuman “alignment” and moral “allegiance” (Smith 1999, 
220). While scholars within animal studies have drawn attention to 
instances of animal affect and “emotional contagion” (see Baker 2000; 
Weik von Mossner 2017, 2018), more work is needed in exploring the 
practiced dimension of interspecies engagement in literature. By better 
accounting for the deliberate, moral structuring devices used by authors 
to encourage “transspecies alliances”, we can better understand how 
conceptions of nonhuman animal agency are contextualized within 
particular sets of social, cultural, historical, and disciplinary frames and 
practices. Before coming to this point, however, I dwell a little longer on 
literary animals.
2. LiterAry AnimALs
While we should be careful in drawing connections between living and 
textual bodies, the tendency to use and disappear animals as extensions of 
and surrogates for human thought, or to view them as bodies to be inter-
preted, is also common in literature. In their function as symbols, meta-
phors, and moralizing examples, animals as animals disappear into sys-
tems of human meaning-making. Here, too, we see a relationship which 
is unidirectional – we can think, for example, of animals as conduits for 
moral lessons in Aesop’s Fables. While these instances of symbolic sur-
rogacy sometimes evoke humor, they are far from harmless. As Josephine 
Donovan has argued, literary devices like metaphor frequently aestheti-
cize animal pain and suffering to explore human feelings (2016, 46). And, 
even when not depicting animal suffering, the use of animals as stand-ins 
for humans reinforces anthropocentric modes of thought which gravitate 
around humans as sole sites of “mattering”. Yet, at the same time, liter-
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ary narratives have the potential to problematize these anthropocentric 
tendencies. For instance, David Herman’s (2011, 2018) work on animal 
narration has demonstrated that along with human-centred approaches 
to literary animals, it is possible to find literary examples which reverse 
this directionality and destabilize taken-for-granted assumptions about 
what it means to be human.
In contrast to human-centered strategies for representing nonhuman 
animals like animal allegory and “anthropomorphic projection”, Herman 
explores strategies of “zoomorphic projection” and, further along the 
representational continuum he posits, “Umwelt exploration”. Where 
zoomorphic projection defamiliarizes the human through transforma-
tions where humans take on nonhuman characteristics (we can think of 
transformational narratives like Franz Kafka’s The Metamorphosis and 
Julio Cortázar’s “Axolotl”), Umwelt explorations attempt to represent 
the experiential or phenomenological world of a nonhuman animal 
(found, for example, in a narrative like Rat by Andrzej Zaniewski). Yet, 
while both of these strategies perform important work in demonstrating 
how “nonhuman ways of encountering the world can reshape humans’ 
own modes of encounter”, neither fully capture the representation of 
humans and animals in Field’s fiction.
Rather than the exploring strategies for representing individual 
humans and other animals, Experimental Animals focuses on relations, 
demonstrating how narratives featuring a human protagonist are capa-
ble of raising “important questions about the scope and limits of self-
hood in a wider world of selves, nonhuman as well as human” (Herman 
2014, 133). According to Herman, a focus on transspecies relationality 
“opens space for biocentric becoming” and situates the human “self 
within wider webs of creatural life” (ibid., 133, 139). In its focus on rela-
tionality, Herman’s work on “narratology beyond the human” chimes 
with theoretical approaches like feminist care ethics – one of the main 
methodological strands woven into this article. Instead of privileging an 
autonomous “self”, proponents of this perspective argue that the world 
is constituted by a myriad of relationships, a “thick mesh of relational 
obligation”, or “care” (Puig de la Bellacasa 2017, 3). In emphasizing 
relationality, the feminist ethics of care perspective “denies the possibi-
lity of an impartial moral standpoint” and instead “sees moral judge-
ments as dependent on situative or relational contexts” (Biller-Andorno 
2002, 42).
Recently, narratological work exploring transspecies encounters 
in literature has focused on care. In “Nonhuman Fictional Charac-
ters and the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis” (2019), Erin James asks, 
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“[can] novels that refuse to anthropomorphize nonhuman characters 
inspire care for real-world nonhuman subjects while also avoiding the 
illusion that readers have direct access to the minds and emotions of 
nonhuman characters?” (ibid., 582). In other words, can readers feel 
with and relate to literary animals whose depiction is not built around 
a recognizable human or human-like consciousness? In an attempt to 
answer these questions, I argue that, unlike Allan Burns, for whom “[w]
ithout an interest in the minds of other animals, empathy cannot exist” 
(2002, 348), care is rooted in the body. It is important to note here that 
in focusing on the body, I do not seek to reinscribe Cartesian dualisms 
like mind/body; rather, as Brian Massumi writes, “body” and “corpore-
ality” should always be understood as part of “a relation of reciprocal 
presupposition as modalities of action differentially belonging to the 
same process; in a word, dynamisms” (2014, 45)  6. Rather than taking 
up in a general sense Jeremy Bentham’s famous question of “can they 
[animals] suffer?” here I focus specifically on the perceptible manifesta-
tions of physical suffering – manifestations we might describe (using the 
common, if contested, metaphor) as appearing on the “skin” or “sur-
face” of animal experience  7. In what follows, I turn to Field’s fiction to 
explore textually-mediated encounters with laboratory animals as both 
“affective” and “practiced”.
 6 See also Stephanie Erev’s lucid synthesis of this idea in “What Is It Like to 
Become a Bat?” (2018). Here she argues that the body and consciousness exist on a 
continuum and “[t]he materialities of our bodies harbor experiences of their own, 
which, although inaccessible to conscious experience, nevertheless help to compose it” 
(ibid., 136).
 7 For more on the relationship between suffering and pain, see Oliver Massin 
(2020). In my focus on the body, I follow the work of scholars like Anat Pick (2011) 
and Ralph Acampora (2006, 2012). For Pick, while scholars like Cary Wolfe critique 
the “discourse of species” internally through “‘inside’ of the site of what used to be 
called the ‘self’ and the ‘subject’”, she works in the opposite direction, “externally, by 
considering the corporeal reality of living bodies” (2011, 2-3). Like Pick, Acampora 
turns to corporeality, seeing a focus on the body as a means through which to redress 
the tendency in trans-human moral theories of extensionism to “‘elevate’ nonhuman 
beings into our still all-too-humanist sphere of moral concern, often by drawing atten-
tion to the ‘higher’ (i.e. humanoid) mental capacities of other organisms”. In contrast, 
for Acampora, the “live body is the primary locus of existential commonality between 
human animals and other organisms, and the appreciation of commonality undergird-
ing differentiation enables the growth of moral relationships” (2012, 236). For more on 
“extensionism”, see Cary Wolfe 2008.
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3. Affect: bodies described
Sew the two ears of a rabbit together, then having fused them, cut one 
below in order to watch the reestablishment of sensibility, and see if the 
action of the sympathetic might then pass from one ear to another. (Field, 
KL 400-405)
Drawn from Claude’s “Red Notebook”, the excerpt above typifies a 
scientific gaze that is “distancing and objectifying”, transforming “being 
into phenomenon” (Panofsky in Donovan 2016, 16). The style of Claude’s 
laboratory shorthand is such that “one often forgets there’s any animal 
involved: The lung did such, the vagus nerve such” (KL 181). Indeed, not 
only does Claude’s writing remove the holistic animal body from view 
through its jargon-heavy partitioning (“On cutting the spinal accessories 
the voice will be seen to stop while breathing nevertheless continues”, 
KL 225), but it also removes his own.
Throughout Experimental Animals, Claude’s writing serves as a 
counterpoint to Fanny’s situated and graphic descriptions of nonhuman 
animals. Through their affective power, her descriptions attune readers 
to animal bodies, encouraging them to see glimmers of animals’ affec-
tive power even in scientific excerpts like Claude’s above. In an interview 
with Field, Lauren Choplin from the Nonhuman Rights Project observes 
how “Experimental Animals seems to have great faith in the rhetorical 
power of straightforward, visceral description of animal experimentation 
and animal suffering” (Field 2017, n.p.). She asks, “How did you want 
description to function in the book?”. In response, Field explains how 
Experimental Animals explores “different aesthetic choices toward suf-
fering and description” and how she is particularly interested in descrip-
tion’s capacity to tangibly evoke suffering bodies. Throughout the fic-
tion, Field portrays the sensory environment of the nineteenth century 
where individuals were able to see, feel, smell, and hear animal suffering. 
For example, Fanny notes how she thinks
more about animals this past year than in all the years combined: howls 
and barks echoing down the narrow streets, and the animals Claude 
lodges in the kitchen – bleeding or half-conscious – crawling with high-
pitched yells into the corners, or lying in a tight ball licking their fur. (KL 
219-233)
As Field’s work articulates, this sensory exposure led to many antivivisec-
tionist protests, forcing the proponents of the practice to close the doors 
to their laboratories indefinitely. Yet, by foregrounding descriptions 
which shift readers from the visual to the haptic – a shift which means 
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that, even from behind a closed door, Fanny “sees feelingly” the “horrific 
agonies of a dog just outside” – Field draws (textual) animal and human 
reader together through the locus of the body (KL 253).
Unlike animal narration and focalization which offer access to the 
“mind” or approximate the experience of animal consciousness  8, the 
descriptions here evoke a type of corporeal compassion (Acampora 2006) 
which engages a full spectrum of the body’s sensory modalities. In place 
of description which operates purely through the visual, Fanny’s gaze is 
what Barbara Ettinger has called “matrixial”:
The matrixial gaze […] enters visuality, disturbs it and change[s] the tab-
leau, because it penetrates and alters the scopic field, which by definition 
is impure – inseparable from other unconscious dimensions of the psyche 
(oral, anal), informed by different sources of the sensibilities (like changes 
in pressure, movement, touch, etc.) and also connected to the unconscious 
of others in intersubjective and trans-subjective spheres. (2001, 90)  9
Fanny’s matrixial gaze positions her as “wit(h)ness” – “a means of being 
with and remembering for the other through the artistic act and through 
an aesthetic encounter” (Pollock 2010, 831). The graphic descriptions 
within Field’s text are vivid enough (particularly in the quantity of 
action verbs they contain) to “cue a strong embodied response in the 
[…] reader” (Weik von Mossner 2017, 80). As animals “howl”, “bark”, 
“yell”, and “crawl”, they break the fiction’s diegetic frame, demonstrat-
ing the proximity of a haptic, matrixial, gaze where it is unavoidable to 
be “touched by what we touch” (Puig de la Bellacasa 2017, 20).
As well as these synaesthetic descriptions, Field problematizes the 
“distance” of the visual sensory modality by creating a degree of proxim-
ity and continuity between Fanny’s own body and those she describes  10. 
  8 Focalization describes “the selection or restriction of narrative information in 
relation to the experience and knowledge of the narrator, the characters or other, more 
hypothetical entities in the storyworld” and is loosely related to “perspective” or “point 
of view” (Niederhoff 2009, 115). While scholars working at the intersection of narra-
tology and animal studies have explored the potential of narration and focalization to 
explore and approximate nonhuman consciousness and experience, less attention has 
been given to the ways in which description might enable or limit our engagements with 
literary animals. For more, see Lambert 2021, forthcoming.
  9 While there are important differences (particularly in relation to the ethi-
cal status of art), the synaesthetic quality of the matrixial gaze shares space with Eva 
Hayward’s concept of “Fingeryeyes” (2010): a “haptic-optic” involving the “overlay of 
sensoriums and the inter- and intrachange of sensations” as well as “expressivity in the 
simultaneity of touching and feeling” (ibid., 581).
 10 For more on the ‘distance’ of vision, see Haraway (1991) 2018 and Puig de la 
Bellacasa 2017, 97-98.
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In the fiction’s opening, Fanny claims that while she and Claude both did 
their “deeds”, it is, she says with a personification that evokes a haptic 
intrusion into the visual, “only [her] eye into which history jabs its finger” 
(KL 39). Fanny seeks to clear her own name from historical smudging at 
the same time that she attempts to defame her husband. Significantly, 
her “testimony” is heavily reliant on descriptions that foreground and 
challenge science’s and – more specifically here – her husband Claude’s 
laboratory shorthand. In contrast to Claude’s “disembodied objectiv-
ity”, Fanny thrusts herself – and her body – into the limelight, using it to 
create proximity with the animals she describes and to demonstrate, very 
self-consciously, that all bodies are situated and all stories are told from a 
certain perspective, place, time, and affective disposition.
Fanny’s descriptions of the affective impact of animal encounters on 
her own body play a crucial role in ensuring the readerly gaze is neither 
detached nor mastering – nor even sympathetic in a Smithian sense  11 – 
but is instead attentive, entangled, and responsive. With her first-person 
narration, Fanny draws us into her world, bringing us close to her body 
as she engages with animals: she “limp[s]” and her “feet burn” as she 
walks the street trying to find stray animals before her husband – who 
will use them for vivisections – does; she “slip[s] across wet stone, fall[s] 
forward, and injure[s] her leg badly” (KL 530), she notes how she is con-
stantly “tired” and “exhausted” (KL 463), and how her “throat and nose 
burn” (KL 466). Out on the streets, looking for animals:
Shit mixes in our shoes […] The rain makes the mud slick, and our boots 
suck it as we tumble into each other, hands down in the sticky mess, the 
cold breaking our skin. (KL 644)
With these descriptions, Fanny draws her body onto the stage, seeking 
to create a “conversation” with pain’s “inarticulate” utterances (KL 199-
204).
In her article on “bridge characters”  12, or a human character who 
feels compassionately towards the nonhuman characters represented, 
James argues that one of the ways in which human characters can bridge 
readerly engagement with a nonhuman animal is through a “symbolic 
twinning” (2019, 590) – that is, by describing the human character’s 
emotional and cognitive responses to situations that are similar to the 
 11 In Adam Smith’s model, sympathy involves an external spectator observing, 
evaluating, and forming judgements about the other, making imaginative leaps across 
an interpersonal distance (Burgess 2011; Fairclough 2013).
 12 James draws the concept of “bridge character” from Suzanne Keen’s Empathy 
and the Novel (2007).
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animal character’s (2019, 590-591). However, in Experimental Animals, 
we are encouraged to be cautious (and critical) about these kinds of sym-
bolic substitutions and the attached experiential conflation. On multiple 
occasions, despite creating proximity between herself and animals, Fanny 
draws attention to strained and irresponsible analogical mappings. Push-
ing on correspondences between vivisectors and authors and husbands, 
she quotes, for example, Balzac’s Physiology of Marriage: “27. Marriage is 
a science. / 28. A man cannot marry before he has studied anatomy and 
dissected at least one woman” (KL 193-198). And, as well as spending a 
great deal of time with Émile Zola and his attempts to extrapolate the sci-
entific method to literature (KL 2838), Fanny introduces author George 
Lewes into the mix, quoting his contention that within the “department” 
of Literature, “criticism […] is also vivisection. There is a great deal of 
real torture inflicted upon authors by critics” – a comparison which is 
questioned explicitly within the text by a “Commission chairman”: “But 
I suppose you would scarcely compare that […] with the fact of a living 
animal being cut up?” (KL 2481, 2486). “Why not?” Lewes responds.
Instead of acting as a symbolic surrogate, Fanny seeks to make her 
body available for a response (Despret 2013), to cultivate a corporeal 
presence and openness, where she – and, possibly by extension, read-
ers – attends to and is affected by animal pain: “[n]oise penetrates the 
body, shaking it awake because ears haven’t lids to close, though we can 
often choose deafness” (KL 118). Rather than “coherence”, Fanny seeks 
conversation, “possibilities of an embodied communication” (Hayward 
2010, 584; Despret 2013, 51). Instead of standing-in for animal experi-
ence, Fanny’s descriptions of her own body encourage readers to bear 
witness and care about similar (but not identical) instances of nonhuman 
suffering. By drawing her body into proximity with those of animals, 
she allows for the circulation of affects, or a “symphysical” relationship 
which, according to Acampora, “designate[s] the felt sense of sharing 
with somebody else a live nexus as experienced in a somatic setting of 
direct or systematic (inter)relationship” (2012, 283). It is to these more 
“systematic” relations that I now turn.
4. PrActice: bodies situAted
By coupling visceral descriptions with narrative strategies like second-
person address and juxtaposition, Field begins to train affect, encour-
aging readers to align themselves ethically with Fanny’s antivivisection-
ist stance. In this way affects are “accumulative” and “the iteration of 
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similar experiences and […] affects […] accumulate[s]” into “disposi-
tions that predispose one to act and react in particular ways” (Watkins 
2010, 278). Through such accumulations, Field encourages readers to 
both align themselves with Fanny’s perspective as well as feel a sense of 
moral allegiance. According to Murray Smith, “alignment” is a result of 
“our access to the actions, thoughts, and feelings of a character” (1999, 
220) and is therefore, as Alexa Weik von Mossner writes, “a matter of 
narrative perspective” (2016, 83). What makes this alignment – and 
its entrainment of affect – particularly effective, though, is the way in 
which it works in concert with Murray’s other category of positioning: 
“allegiance”. Distinct from alignment, allegiance “refers to the way 
in which narrative ‘elicits responses of sympathy’ toward a character. 
Such responses are ‘triggered – if not wholly determined – by the moral 
structure’ of the narrative” (Smith in Weik von Mossner 2016, 83). 
Through its series of micro and macro conflicts, Experimental Animals 
continually asks readers to assess their alignments and allegiances – a 
challenge which may, in turn, lead readers to critically reflect why they 
have adopted particular perspectival and ethical positions. Throughout 
the fiction, readers participate in a process of “side-taking” in what Fritz 
Breithaupt has called a three-person model of empathy where one person 
(in this case, the reader) “observes the conflict of two others [Fanny and 
Claude]” (2012, 84). To use Lori Gruen’s succinct phrasing, “[w]e live 
in a world of conflicts and need guidance about how to resolve at least 
some of that conflict, some of the time” – here I look at how narrative 
strategies and depictions of animal agency guide readers’ alignment and 
moral allegiance (2012, 226).
One of the key strategies Experimental Animals employs to draw 
readers into the action of the text is second-person address: “Did you 
hear him [Claude] say that to understand a watch isn’t to watch it but 
to break it?” (KL 26). Like a finger that jabs itself into potentially pas-
sive eyes, Fanny’s frequent use of second-person address works with the 
visceral descriptions to draw readers out of detached, and passive obser-
vation. As well as this, it works with Fanny’s use of first-person plural 
to call out across textual and historical boundaries, drawing readers 
into her growing antivivisectionist community: is it “what we hear that 
determines what we’ll do?” (KL 995). Beyond the micro-level grammati-
cal alignments, juxtaposition plays an important role in encouraging our 
alignment with Fanny. As alluded to in the previous section, across the 
novel, visceral descriptions of animal pain always occur in a “set-piece” 
alongside a “clinical” and disembodied excerpt from “Claude’s Red 
Notebook”. Where Fanny recounts how
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a raspy whine pulls me to a rabbit in a box in the kitchen. She is cut practi-
cally in half, and relaxes into death when touched on the head. What kind 
of greeting is this? I think, holding her paw. (KL 301)
Claude writes, “Rabbits lose their sugar when they are varnished. Would 
it be the same if their spinal cords were cut at the same time?” (KL 301). 
Here, the shifts in register are played out across two characters, creating 
oppositional modes of relation: one of the embodied activist and one of 
the disembodied scientist  13.
Juxtapositions like these work in conjunction with three other inter-
related strategies which morally structure the text, syncing up readerly 
alignment and allegiance. Firstly, it is possible to read the fiction’s judi-
cial framing (“she goes safely to trial whose Father is a judge”, KL 45) 
as a strategy to force readers to take a side in the conflicts. Accord-
ing to Breithaupt, in a three-person model of empathy, “A judicative 
decision can be made when it is calculated which of the two opponents 
is morally or legally right” (2012, 89). Again, by positioning an evoca-
tive description like “Of course the animal feels every poke and jolt 
without a way to cry” alongside Claude’s “What morality says we can’t 
do to those like us, science authorizes us to do to animals”, Field pits 
two competing perceptions of animals (as either affective or analytic) 
against one another (KL 298). While this alone may not create a sense 
of allegiance with Fanny and the animals, the judicial framing of the 
fiction works with more localized strategies for directing allegiance. As 
Breithaupt writes, individuals may base their decision to take a particu-
lar side on the basis of “self-reflexivity” (2012, 89). In these instances, 
“[o]ne may side with the more passive party in a conflict because as on 
observer open is also in a more passive, receptive position” – a position 
which may “predispose” the observer to take sides “with the tenden-
tially more passive of the observed persons, the victims, the sufferers, 
the weaker, or simply those to whom the action happens” (ibid.)  14. 
While Fanny’s vivid descriptions make a case for animals as affective 
agents, in Claude’s passages, readers who are separated from the action 
by textual and historical boundaries and unable to intervene will likely 
 13 In Narratology beyond the Human, Herman compares the action-oriented reg-
ister (associated with subjectivity and agency) with event-oriented register (associated 
with objectivity and passivity) (2018, 241). These categories can be read alongside 
Lynch’s categories of the “naturalistic” and “analytic” animal, respectively (1988).
 14 Breithaupt is, of course, careful to remind readers that “the privileging of the 
weak and the passivity of observation as a form of sympathy is culturally coded” (2012, 
89). For more on narrative empathy with those similar to us (Keen 2006, 212).
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feel a greater sense of allegiance with “voiceless” animals who, after 
being poisoned with curare (a substance which acts on the connection 
between brain and motor nerves), endure “sufferings more atrocious 
than the imagination can invent” – deprived not of “sensation or intel-
ligence, but only of the means of expressing these through movement” 
(KL 293).
Lastly, these juxtapositions work with causality. As Anna Lindhé 
notes, “when we are able to detect a clear causal connection – ‘this pain 
was caused by that person or event’ – empathy is ‘generally stronger’ 
than when such connection is absent” (Cook 2011, 82 in Lindhé 
2016, 31). By placing the descriptions of animals in set-pieces, Field 
ensures that readers connect the suffering animals we find in Fanny’s 
descriptions with the “analytic animals” we find in Claude’s writing: 
“the animals Claude lodges in the kitchen – bleeding or half-conscious” 
(KL 222; my emphasis). Where Fanny attunes her senses to, especially, 
sounds of animal suffering, Claude discovers “the trick of cutting dogs’ 
vocal cords” (KL  258). Coupled with her first-person narration and 
linguistic strategies for community-building, it is possible to argue that 
through the fiction’s judicial framing, readerly reflexivity, and the map-
ping of causality, we are gradually, accumulatively, trained to respond 
to animal affect in a manner similar to Fanny: not by “cutting” but by 
attending.
As Donald Nathanson articulates, “Affect is motivating but never 
localizing; the experience of affect tells us only that something needs our 
attention. Other systems must be engaged in order to decide what must 
be done and how” (2008, xiii). In Field’s text, visceral descriptions are 
deliberately framed, creating an “affective accumulation” that encour-
ages us to bear witness and care about nonhuman suffering. Rather than 
observing animal suffering “from above” we “wit(h)ness” the suffering of 
animals in an encounter which “acknowledges the gap between different 
beings, times and places, while ethically making each partner vulnerable 
to the other’s trauma” (Pollock 2010, 838). The mediation of visceral 
descriptions through Fanny creates an transspecies encounter where we 
engage with animals care-fully across an ethically-attuned, but necessary 
distance. Where Field’s protagonist asks, “doesn’t writing always hide 
the bodies?” the text itself answers with, “well, that depends on how you 
describe them” (KL 2958).
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I can’t help asking: what is care? Is it simply where you put your attention? 
Is it a feeling of fellowship, or can you care about unknown things? If I 
say I care about you, is it because I acknowledge we share something in 
common? What is pain for, I also wonder: it speaks in a thousand inarticu-
late ways, yet seeks a conversation. (KL 199-204)
Asked early in Experimental Animals, Fanny’s series of questions about 
the operations of care probe some of the key issues explored through-
out this essay: attention, commonality, and fellowship. In part two, I 
explored the ways in which detached observation is troubled by haptic 
descriptions of animal bodies. In evoking a range of sensory modalities, 
these descriptions “touch” the bodies of Fanny and her readers, encour-
aging a greater recognition of the agency of animals to affect the world 
and bodies around them. Field further enables this kind of exchange by 
bringing Fanny’s body into proximity with those of animals, creating a 
sense of corporeal conversation in place of anthropocentric monologues 
like that of the Zhejiang rat cyborg experiment. Rather than creating or 
reinforcing distance, the descriptions I have explored encourage us to 
“see feelingly”, to locate points of connection and moments of reciproc-
ity in which animals are no longer the objects of our gaze, but, instead, 
also agents of the description (Stewart 2016, 33).
In the final part of this paper, I considered the “practiced” dimen-
sion of care by exploring how these affective descriptions work in con-
cert with structuring devices like grammatical alignments and juxtaposi-
tions. By employing these devices, Field trains our affective responses so 
that Fanny’s textual attitudes and practices become the ghostly preludes 
(and possibilities) to our own. In both description and bridging, Field 
keeps Fanny and readers on the surface of animal experience and at a 
slight remove – she avoids anthropomorphizing animals by depicting 
their minds, and she also resists the conflation of human and animal 
experience favouring instead a careful mode of relation which cuts across 
empathy’s feeling with and sympathy’s feeling for. While a number of 
scholars have explored the potential for the “emotional contagion” 
of affecting textual encounters to encourage transspecies empathy, in 
looking at specific devices that direct affect, we might develop a more 
nuanced understanding of how literary texts influence readers’ attitudes 
on issues like animal agency  15. As Vera Nünning writes (summarizing 
recent neurological research), “the plasticity of the brain ensures that 
 15 See for example Weik von Mossner 2017, 2018.
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extended and repeated practice will have biological as well as mental 
consequences” (2015, 40). By attending to devices that repeatedly direct 
our affective responses, we might begin to consider reading itself as an 
“affective practice” (Wetherell 2013, 2015) – a move which brings affect 
into dialogue with deliberation, reminding us that “[c]ontext, past and 
current practice, and complex acts of meaning-making and representation 
are involved in the spreading of affect, no matter how random or viral it 
appears” (Wetherell 2015, 154).
By exploring the ways in which language can “hide the bodies”, 
Field’s fiction seems to intimate that what is lost in a scientific view (at 
least on the level of discourse) is a crucial recognition of messy, reciprocal 
entanglement where “scientists and animals are fleshy creatures which are 
enacted and enacting through their embodied choreography” (Despret 
2013, 69). This recognition is not about becoming more “emotional” in 
scientific practice, but about becoming more “accurate”. As Puig de la 
Bellacasa notes, “the term ‘accurate’ derives from care, ‘prepared with 
care, exact’” (2017, 91) – an etymological relation, which opens onto an 
ethics or a politics concerned with the “thick, impure, involvement in a 
work where the question of how to care needs to be posed” (Puig de la 
Bellacasa 2017, 6). This kind of question is dynamic and processual and 
in scientific contexts should, to use Vinciane Despret’s words, engage 
with “interesting questions that give animals a chance to demonstrate 
their interests” since such questions have important implications for the 
accuracy and ethics of scientific practice (2015, 121). For, as Despret 
claims, “the question of response is a question whose answer changes 
everything” (ibid., 122).
Literature like Field’s articulates and reflects on the ethical complex-
ity of animal experimentation, bringing into sharp relief the problematic 
quality of work – like Zhang et al.’s mind controlled rat – that fails to 
acknowledge and carefully attend to such considerations. Field’s fic-
tion also offers a space for thinking through and critically engaging with 
laboratories as sites of reciprocity and considers how affective encounters 
translate in writing. Through haptic description and the situated prac-
tice of “wit(h)nessing”, readers of Experimental Animals enter into webs 
of care where they are forced to (re)hear the cries which, to repurpose 
George Eliot’s words, “lie on the other side of silence” ([1871-2] 2000, 
162). Or, perhaps, following Field, the cries which “lie on the other side 
of” science.
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